Charitable Giving, Everyday Morality and A Critique of Bourdieusian Theory: An Investigation into Disinterested Judgements, Moral Concerns and Reflexivity in the UK

12 January 2011

Dr Balihar Sanghera, SSPSSR, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK (b.s.sanghera@kent.ac.uk)

Abstract

The paper examines how individuals are morally reflexive beings, who interpret the social world in relation to things that matter to them, and how charitable acts are embedded in their lives with different degrees of meaning and importance. The paper criticises the Bourdieusian theory on giving, because individuals lack significant capabilities, such as reflexivity, emotions and disinterestedness. Drawing upon Margaret Archer’s and Andrew Sayer’s works on human reflexivity and lay normativity, I will suggest that there are three modes of moral reflexivity that have various implications for charitable giving, moral obligations and civil society. First, moral conventionalists, who value familial and social networks, use charity events as an opportunity to socialise and to have fun. Second, moral individualists, who are strongly committed to work and career, view charitable practices as performative acts that demonstrate their knowledge and skills. Third, moral critics are deeply committed to charitable causes, motivated by strongly held values and beliefs, which offer alternative visions for society.
Keywords: charitable giving, everyday morality, reflexivity, moral sentiments and Bourdieusian theory

Acknowledgements

This paper is an output of a project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, UK (Award No: RES-593-25-0003). It is part of a wider collaborative study being conducted at the Universities of Kent and Southampton, entitled 'Charity and Social Redistribution: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives', within the ESRC Centre for Charitable Giving and Philanthropy (www.cgap.org.uk). The author is grateful for the funding, which comes from the ESRC, The Office for Civil Society, the Scottish Government and Carnegie (UK) Trust.
This paper aims to explain the nature of individuals' moral judgements about charitable giving and volunteering. Individuals are reflexive beings who possess deep moral concerns, navigating constraints and opportunities to realise their life projects (Archer 2003; 2007). It is in the context of their personal life projects that individuals make moral decisions about charitable acts, so that giving can be either weakly or strongly embedded in everyday life. The paper will provide an understanding of everyday morality of giving, by contextualising the significance and meanings of charitable practices, events and causes in relation to life projects. I will suggest that individuals engage in disinterested moral judgements, which cannot be dismissed as 'illusio' as in the Bourdieusian approach (Sayer 2005). The paper will contribute towards a trans-disciplinary analysis of giving, drawing upon various literatures, such as sociology, moral philosophy and philanthropy, which are often viewed separately.

Everyday morality refers to how individuals often deliberate about moral responsibilities towards others, assessing what is appropriate behaviour (Sayer 2005). Individuals have a sense of moral obligation to their family members, neighbours, work colleagues, clients, wider community, distant others, the environment and non-human animals. We are always embedded in a moral web of responsibilities and obligations, as social relationships consist of normative expectations and needs, so that to abstain from making moral judgements is to be cut off from social relationships (Benhabib 1992). Furthermore, as humans are vulnerable, interdependent and needy beings, we often sympathise with our fellow-beings' situations, and offer support and assistance (Smith 1976). Everyday morality requires practical moral reasoning, weighing up conflicting demands and drawing upon institutional rules and social norms. It is difficult to imagine human existence without trust and integrity in markets (Hirschman 1982), professional ethics in the public sector (Keat 2000), care and compassion in families (Finch and Mason 1993), and moral justifications for private property and quasi-public spaces (Alexander 2009).

Individuals deliberate on a multiplicity of goods (such as friendship, work, the family, leisure, education, political causes and religion), prioritising and dovetailing them in different ways depending upon how they reflect upon their dominant moral concerns and personal circumstances (Archer 2003). The significance of charitable practices, events and causes will vary amongst individuals in light of their concerns and commitments. For some, charitable causes are essential to their way of life, whereas for others charitable acts are an incidental and marginal activity. Drawing upon Archer's (2003; 2007) and Sayer's (2005; 2010) works on personal reflexivity and lay normativity, I will suggest that individuals undertake different modes of moral reflexivity, from intense and critical evaluations on charitable giving to fleeting and spontaneous thoughts about them.

The topic of giving has a special status in Bourdieu's writing from his earlier work on Kabyles in Algeria to his later writing on neo-liberalism (Bourdieu 1977; 2000; Silber 2009; Caillé 2001). Giving is paradigmatic of his theoretical vision of the economy of symbolic goods. It reveals the economic character of all practices, in that while claiming to be 'disinterested', it is oriented towards the maximisation of economic and symbolic profits (Curtis 1997; Shapely 2001; Kidd 1996). Giving constitutes the canonical case for his idea of the 'double truth', exemplifying the operations underpinning the symbolic alchemy that produces disinterested judgements and spontaneous actions into symbolic interests and profits. The philanthropic field is far
from being ethical, rather practitioners strategise in ways that disguise their particular interests, having an interest in disinterestedness. Charitable acts, like cultural tastes, present the hidden and soft form of violence that help to legitimise and universalise the practices of the dominant class (Ostrower 1998; Collins and Hickman 1991; see also Skeggs 2009; Savage 2003).

But while moral judgements can be distorted by power, vested interests, identities and norms, individuals can also make genuinely disinterested judgements about moral worth and can adopt an impartial and critically reflexive instance towards others (Smith 1976; Sayer 2005). Moral sentiments and judgements can be class neutral, and ethical actions can cut across class boundaries. I will argue that class and gender do not necessarily explain how individuals make judgements about moral concerns, commitments and charitable acts.

The paper has four sections. The first section will begin by offering a Bourdieusian analysis of charitable acts and judgements. I will then argue that it is insufficient to understand and explain moral judgements and practices, and I will propose an alternative framework based upon moral concerns and sentiments, practical judgements and personal capabilities. I will describe the research design and methods in the second section. In the third section, key findings will be discussed, in particular it will examine three modes of moral reflexivity on charitable acts. Finally, I will make some concluding remarks.

Theoretical Approaches to Charitable Giving

I will briefly examine the Bourdieusian analysis of the philanthropic field, and its critical stance on giving. After criticising this perspective for failing to take into account ethical and disinterested judgements, I will offer an alternative framework based upon moral concerns and sentiments, practical judgements and personal capabilities, suggesting three modes of moral reflexivity.

The Bourdieusian Approach: The Philanthropic Field

Gift giving is paradigmatic of the Bourdieusian approach to the economy of symbolic goods, such as cultural events, professional practices and family ceremonies (Silber 2009: Caillé 2001). The Bourdieusian framework offers a critical analysis of the economic character of symbolic relationships and practices, pointing out the transmutation of economic into cultural and symbolic capital. For instance, business elites can display their refined cultural tastes by donating to opera, theatre, ballet and art galleries. The logic of symbolic exchanges contains a kind of social alchemy, transforming relations of power and domination into legitimate and moral relations. When rich donors become involved with local and national charities, they become associated with notions of care, benevolence and duty, making them appear as altruistic and morally upstanding members of the community (Ostrower 1998; Shapely 1998; 2001). The media also eulogise those who are actively associated with the charity sector, new buildings honour them, and foundations are set up in their names. While a sense of religious salvation and eligibility for tax deductions may be important benefits, the major reward donors receive is the symbolic status of being recognised as an altruistic person, so enhancing their power and authority in the community (Collins and Hickman 1991).

Charitable giving encompasses two opposing truths of giving: giving as a subjective and experiential act of disinterestedness and altruism, and as an objective and structural way to accumulate prestige, authority and power. Bourdieu (2000) argues
that the two contradictory truths are sustained by individual and collective forms of
deception that create the fiction of spontaneous and disinterested giving, in that
individuals and the community deliberately mis-recognise and repress the economic
basis of the gift exchange. Collins and Hickman (1991) note that while cultural charity
parties are legitimate gatherings for the purpose of collecting money for charitable
causes, they largely serve to sustain and develop participants’ own cultural and social
capital. Prestigious fundraising events allow high status donors to meet other high
status persons, to partake in mutual admiration of each others’ charitable causes, to
display their superior tastes in clothes and jewellery, and to entertain and network with
business and social elites.

While individuals do not always act in a reflexive and rational manner, their actions
are shaped by their habitus (personal qualities, dispositions and character) in the
social field that enable them to have a ‘feel for the game’ and to strategise and
improvise to accumulate economic and symbolic capital (Swartz 1997). Donors’
‘generous’ habitus overcomes the conflicting interpretations of altruism versus egoism,
long entrenched in the discussion of the ethics of giving (see Schrift 1997; Osteen
2002; Cheal 1988; Schnewind 1996), in that although giving may appear to be
voluntary and selfless, it is in fact semi-consciously strategised for self-interest.

Shapely (1998) explains how during the Victorian period, charity leaders and
philanthropists in Manchester, England needed to demonstrate appropriate moral
qualities and temperament that stressed their Christian duty to others, and to
improvise their strategies as the charity field and political and social forces changed.
In late nineteenth century Britain, charity was a vital means of acquiring and
reinforcing symbolic capital, social position and political authority, as the community
held such associations in high regard. But with the rise of trade unions and the
working class politics at the turn of the century, charities began to lose their symbolic
value, as opposition rose to them as a means to alleviate poverty. With the rise of a
consumer society and the popularity of sports, such as football, local leaders began to
associate themselves with cultural and sporting events to enhance their social status
in the community.

A critical analysis of the philanthropic field reveals that despite claims of
disinterestedness, individual donors and status groups will employ strategies to
create symbolic distinctions, in order to develop their personal and collective prestige,
authority and power. In a society where almost everyone can afford donations, upper
middle class individuals may distinguish themselves by giving to cultural institutions
and international organisations, such as traditional universities and environmental
causes in developing countries, which are less accessible to working class people
(Ostrower 1998). Middle class individuals’ judgements on charitable giving (such as
donations to environmental movements and the homeless) can reveal their class
sentiments of superiority over and condescension towards the working class. In turn,
working people’s charitable judgements (such as giving to hospitals and local
museums) can counter the negative class judgements they endure in everyday life
with compassion, care and national patriotism (for a general discussion on working
class judgements see Skeggs 2009).

In investigating charitable acts, Curtis (1997) suggests that scholars need ‘to be able
to recognise as such the strategies which, in universes in which people have an
interest in being disinterested, tend to disguise these strategies’ (Bourdieu 1972: 26).
Scholars also need to investigate the intersection of class, gender and ethnicity and
the particular religious, cultural and political movements to account for the
development of a philanthropic interest in disinterest (Kidd 1996).
The Ethics of the Philanthropic Field

An unsatisfying element of Bourdieu’s work is his treatment on disinterested judgements. Despite warning his readers not to mis-read him as offering a reductionist, economistic and cynical narrative of symbolic exchanges, ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ loom large in his work (Bourdieu 2000). Caillé (2001) argues that although Bourdieu becomes preoccupied with the issue of disinterestedness as a possibility, there is little real change in his theoretical vision because disinterestedness is still conceived as merely illusory. Bourdieu does want to move beyond his earlier critical and demystifying account of gift giving. Silber (2009) notes that Bourdieu describes more subtleties and ambiguities in the subjective experience of gift giving. It is striking that in his last note on giving (Bourdieu 2000: 191-202), in the final paragraph there is a positive and prescriptive valorisation of disinterestedness. Bourdieu (2000: 201-2) suggests that disinterested giving emerges as something that has been suppressed by neo-liberalism, and needs to be cultivated again:

The cult of individual success, preferably economic, that has accompanied the expansion of neo-liberalism has tended – in a period when, to make it easier to ‘blame the victims’, there is a greater tendency than ever to pose political problems in moral terms – to obscure the need for collective investment in the institutions that produce the economic and social conditions for virtue, or, to put it another way, that cause the civic virtues of disinterested giving and devotion – a gift to the group – to be encouraged and rewarded by the group. The purely speculative and typically scholastic question of whether generosity and disinterestedness are possible should give way to the political question of the means that have to be implemented in order to create universes in which, as in gift economies, agents and groups would have an interest in disinterestedness and generosity, or rather, could acquire a durable disposition to respect these universally respected forms of respect of the universal.

But Bourdieu’s positive normative stance contradicts his longstanding critical tone against disinterested giving and generosity. He fails to acknowledge the contradiction, and does not provide an adequate theoretical account of giving (see Silber (2009) for the three stages of Bourdieu’s ideas on giving).

There are four problems to the Bourdiesuan perspective that critical consciousness is able to go behind the naïve and mistaken appearance of piety, virtue and disinterestedness, and that giving is a form of disguised subtle interests. First, Bourdiesuan ideas of domination and interest have to be based upon a shared set of ethical values that cannot be reduced to a culturally arbitrary standard, otherwise politics becomes a crude Hobbesian power struggle between different interests (Garnham 1993: 185). Sayer (1999) also notes that any critique of judgements presupposes a critical standpoint that embodies a normative position from which practices are judged. But Bourdieu’s attempt to reach beyond the critical consciousness to a place that can entertain an idea of an ethical field par excellence where ethical and disinterested judgements reign fails, because he is largely suspicious of disinterestedness and refrains from discussing lay normativity (Sayer 2010).

Second, Bourdieu neglects the importance of moral sentiments and judgements in everyday encounters and relationships (Sayer 1999; 2005). Human beings possess the capacity to be sympathetic towards others’ situation, so that particular sentiments, such as compassion, guilt and anger, can arise, and we can evaluate both the
situation and our sentiments to make a judgement on what is appropriate behaviour, taking into account what is deserving of praise and praiseworthy (Smith 1976). Nussbaum (2001a: 23-33) argues that emotions have real effects on behaviour, and relate to things that we have reason to value. Emotions can trigger deliberate intervention and purposeful behaviour in situations where individuals are in need, or have faced misfortune and deserve care. Moral emotions are important for human well being, since emotions can respond to individuals in vulnerable situations and can inform and motivate social actors to give assistance, care and support. While Bourdieu emphasises how habitus shapes everyday practices, the role of moral emotions is ignored.

Third, the Bourdieusian analysis of the economy of symbolic goods fails to appreciate how economic and social practices possess intrinsic worth that help to define and shape them, so that they are not reducible to economic and symbolic capital (Sayer 2005). MacIntyre (1985: 187-95) notes that practices possess both internal and external goods: internal goods refer to personal pleasure, integrity, worthiness and competence that can only be identified by reference to the specific nature of a practice, and are only achievable through the experience of involvement in its activities. External goods refer to money, power, praise and status that are not dependent upon the specific nature of a practice, and can be achieved through other practices. Internal and external goods depend upon each other to achieve a successful practice. A Bourdieusian narrative that denies the role of integrity and worthiness in shaping donations, arguing that individuals deliberately mis-recognise the economic, can only ever offer an incomplete explanation of the practice.

Finally, Sayer (1999) suggests that the Bourdieusian social field of symbolic practices is an amoral economy, because economic instrumentalism characterises the social field, and symbolic profit, price and capital motivate behaviour. Giving is driven by identity-insensitive reasons with the aim to create and sustain symbolic capital, rather than for any particular concern for individuals or causes. There is no place for ethics in the philanthropic field, which strangely becomes amoral.

**Everyday Morality and Giving**

An alternative approach to giving argues that morality is integral to everyday life, and that moral sentiments, responsibilities and judgements partly constitute the lived experience and everyday morality (Benhabib 1992: 124-129; Sayer 2005: 5-12; Nussbaum 2000: 264-269). Everyday morality describes how ordinary individuals, who are emotionally entangled in social relationships, have to prioritise and dovetail incommensurable moral concerns, and have to deliberate on what is the right thing to do. Moral sentiments relate to things that we have reason to value, moving us into action. Moral responsibilities are unavoidable, in that as vulnerable, needy and interdependent human beings, we have to care for and are cared by others. Moral judgements are equally pervasive, in that we are always embedded in a web of human relationships that shape and are shaped by moral obligations, expectations, rights and norms, requiring us to evaluate moral claims.

The nature of human beings is such that we possess and are motivated by ethical dispositions and qualities (what moral philosophers call virtues), make practical judgements partly instrumental, partly moral, value a multiplicity of goods, such as education, friendship and hobbies, and pursue our own and others’ well being (Nussbaum 1990: 54-105; Sayer 2010: 115; see also Benhabib 1992: 133-137). As Smith (1976) notes, moral judgements involve natural sympathetic feelings for fellow beings by imagining what it would be like to be in their situation, and deliberations on
our moral responsibilities to others by considering social approbation, worthiness and moral rules. Benhabib (1992: 189-190) argues that given how fragile and interdependent human affairs are, lay moral judgements do not only address questions of injustice (such as oppression, inequalities and lack of dignity), but also of care (including vulnerability, attachment and benevolence).

Different life experiences, resources and powers can give raise to different judgments of compassion, responsibility and charitable acts (Nussbaum 1995: 390). Individuals’ sense of responsibility to others can be distorted by class contempt, shame, gender norms and other forms of discrimination (Lamont 1992; 2000; Skeggs 2009). But sympathetic feelings and moral sentiments can override class sentiments and the effects of ‘othering’ (Sayer 2005: 163-167).

For neo-Aristotelians (such as Nussbaum 2001b: 290-317), morality involves practical wisdom, deliberation, emotions and habits. While practical wisdom and deliberation are commended in an ethical decision making process, sentiments and habits are sometimes dismissed as being irrational (for exception see Smith 1976). But moral emotions are cognitive but fallible judgements about things we have reason to value, and moral habits are embodied responses to situations that we have learnt through life experience, early socialisation and moral education. It is not always necessary for individuals, who act ethically in a semi-conscious way, to articulate and justify their actions at a discursive level. Sayer (2010: 117) insists that both reflexivity and habituation are important in understanding everyday morality:

We should understand lay normativity as embedded in the flow of practice and concrete experience, in which we continually monitor and evaluate things, partly subconsciously through our emotional responses, and partly consciously through reflection, whether this involves ephemeral musings or focused deliberation.

For instance, on the one hand, giving can be highly reflexive, an outcome of a complex decision making process, in that individuals have sympathetic feelings towards their recipients, seek to achieve normative ideals and frame the situation as one deserving their attention.

On the other hand, giving can be spontaneous and habitual, arising from ethical dispositions, emotions and character. In experiencing an emotional moral tug, individuals can semi-consciously donate to well-known charities, or can make excuses and justifications for not donating, resulting in akratic and self-deceptive moral judgements (Rorty 1985; Mele 2001). Of course, our emotional responses can be evaluated in relation to how well we are deeply concerned by charitable causes.

It is because we are human beings with ultimate concerns and deep commitments, living in a world not of our own making, that reflexivity is necessary. We assess what social factors constrain and enable our life projects, how much endurance is needed to stay the course, and decide what to do next (Archer 2003; 2010). Reflexivity constitutes personal orientation and stance towards society. Moral concerns, practices and situations are always understood through our fallible descriptions of them, and we often make mistakes. Self-deception, rationalisation of wrongs, self-denial, feeling exempt from the rule, mis-calculations and excessive emotions trip us as we strive towards our goal.

Archer (2007) suggests that different modes of reflexivity can shape how individuals understand and evaluate ethical action. Over the course of their lives, individuals establish a dominant mode of reflexivity, moral concern and habits that have
significant implications for how they evaluate charities. Archer (2003; 2007) argues that there are three dominant modes of reflexivity and concern. First, individuals, whose primary concern is familial and collegial solidarity, subordinate other concerns, such as studies, work and faith. Such individuals have intense and dense interpersonal relationships, and are characterised by normative conventionality, meaning that moral principles and standards connect them to family and friends, and social networks censure their moral behaviour. They are moral conventionalists, who regard charity events as an opportunity to socialise and to have fun with significant others; for instance, a person may volunteer with her friends to run in a charity marathon. Their sympathy and compassion beyond their micro-worlds are restricted to familiar groups in the local community. Although their charitable acts exhibit a degree of sympathy, compassion and beneficence towards vulnerable and suffering groups, their giving tends to be short-lived and spatially restricted. Consequently, giving is weakly embedded into their lives. They are mobilised to donate by popular media appeals, conveniently placed collection boxes, local fetes and national disasters. While giving is heart-felt, it is not deep.

Second, individuals, whose dominant concern is work, often undertake studies and training, and obtain satisfaction from getting their performative acts right. Self-discipline, self-responsibility and self-improvement are part of their identity. They accommodate family and friends, but demand autonomy and privacy. Given their preoccupation with work and career, they minimise their contact with social collectives and associations. They are moral individualists, who pursue integrity, recognition and satisfaction in their performative practices, and take pride in their work. Their dedication to work and performance means that moral deliberations on giving do not absorb them, and are incidental and marginal to their everyday practices. Moral individualists regard charitable practices as an opportunity to demonstrate their competence, skills and knowledge. Charitable acts have an instrumental and strategic value, such as securing future employment, and are characterised by self-interest and reciprocity. Moral individualists are largely ambivalent about charities; they may give, but not themselves.

Third, individuals, whose dominant concern is values, are sensitive to issues of injustice, suffering and oppression. They possess a sense of calling, and their attempt at holistic integration of concerns produces an eventful personal story. They are moral critics of society, who intensely scrutinise thought and action, take initiatives to promote their beliefs and values, and actively participate in civil society. Charitable causes are strongly embedded in their lives, and are seen as an opportunity to express their sympathy, compassion and justice for distant and unknown others. Their values and faith, which are an amalgam of cultural and political beliefs and ideas derived from different moral tradition, motivate their acts. Giving is thoughtful and purposeful; for instance, a person may scrutinise cancer research charities for animal testing before giving. Charitable acts, such as tithes, are seen as a matter of moral obligation towards vulnerable groups and minority causes, despite having a heavy burden upon low-income donors. Moral sentiments of compassion, fairness and integrity trump class sentiments of superiority, disgust, embarrassment and guilt. Moral critics give themselves to their causes, but sometimes become dissatisfied as charities fail to meet their ethical ideals.

**Research Design and Methods**

I conducted in-depth interviews with 41 individuals from different occupations,
including public sector administrators, university lecturers, social care workers, home-
keepers, mature students and retirees. In many cases, I knew the interviewees prior to
the research, so that they were comfortable to talk about their personal history, from
their early childhood and schooling to their family and work life. The semi-structured
interviews consisted of two parts, lasting on average 2.25 hours. The first part asked
the interviewees to recount their life history, describing the twists and turns in their
lives, their personal goals and their everyday practices. In the second part, they
recalled significant acts of giving and volunteering, describing their feelings and
motivations. Every time interviewees mentioned emotions and morality, they were
prompted to go on talking and to give illustrations. A picture emerged of how they
have had to navigate their way through life, dovetailing and prioritising various moral
concerns and commitments in an environment that they could not control. It is in this
context that their charitable acts are understood and explained.

Using Bourdieusian concepts of economic, cultural and symbolic capital, I assigned
interviewees into three categories of social class: upper and lower middle class and
working class. In my sample, twenty-one were working class, thirteen lower middle
class and seven upper middle class. Although attempts were made to get an equal
gender balance, more women were willing to participate in the research than men.
Twenty-six women and fifteen men participated in the study. The sample consisted of
five ‘black’ interviewees, and eight retirees. A majority of the interviewees lived most of
their lives in the English county of Kent, and several had moved to the county because
of work, family or studies. Six interviewees lived outside the South-East region of
England.

All the interviews were tape-recorded, and the interviewees were reassured about
confidentiality and anonymity. The interviews were transcribed, and then the
transcripts were returned to them to check and edit. Only a few made slight alterations
to the text, correcting minor factual details. The subsequent analysis was based on the
use of Nvivo 8, a computer software programme for analysing qualitative data.

Moral Judgements on Charitable Acts

This section will discuss how individuals with different moral concerns can produce
distinct sets of moral judgements on giving: conventional normativity, moral
individualism and compassion and social justice.

Conventional Normativity

Individuals with a deep moral commitment to family members and friends have a
strong sense of moral obligation towards them (Finch and Mason 1993). Their lived
experience centres on supporting children, elderly parents and friends, and their
personal identity is closely aligned to other people’s lives. Jane1, a working class
postgraduate mature student, enjoys being with her children, with whom she has a
strong emotional attachment:

We are very much together, and I love it, you go in and you go through the
front gate and we are in our world. Me and the girls and sometimes children’s
friends will come round but not that often and I love that, our little island. And
it’s really quite nice, anti-social but it’s nice when we do want we want to do,
because they are my little friends, really. So we are quite a little unit.

1 The names of my interviewees have been changed to ensure anonymity.
The intense bond with her children means that Jane has little time for socialising and doing things outside her micro social world. For some individuals (in particular single parents and home-keepers), their lives revolve around family and friends, from getting their children ready for school to preparing the evening dinner. As a mother of two growing children, Mary, a former lower middle class legal secretary now a part-time mature student, has to fit other concerns (such as studies) around her children's school schedule and family visits:

I normally get up about 6, go for a run, with the dog, come back, get the kids all sorted out, get their breakfast sorted out. I always like to give them a cooked breakfast, so I give them a cooked breakfast. While they’re eating that I go up and get showered, get changed, go down, take them to school, come [to the university], pick them up from school, start the dinner, take the dog for another walk, just do their homework. . . . I’ve got into the habit of coming to the university to sit in the library and do work because I found staying at home I ended up cleaning the house until 11.30 then I’d be hungry or might start get on the phone to somebody, so I was doing absolutely nothing to do with college work so if I’m out the house I actually crack on and get on with it. . . . Since the mid-term break, I’ve been just catching up with friends and I had both of my sisters over and they all stayed at mum’s so I was down there every day, taking them out here, there and everywhere, so that’s three weeks of holiday.

For moral conventionalists, who value familial and collegial solidarity, giving is socially embedded in their everyday practices, reinforcing personal and social networks and not disrupting their settled way of life (Eckstein 2001). During the summer, James, a working class estates supervisor, and his wife enjoy going to private gardens, especially those that support the Macmillan Cancer Support charity:

Macmillan nurses we’ve always supported them because we go to the open gardens in the summer. I don’t know if you know about the open gardens, but it’s a yellow book you can buy in summer and it’s private owners who open their gardens and the Macmillan nurses take a percentage of that, quite a big percentage, So it’s called The Yellow Garden Scheme, and the gardens are open, we’re lucky in Kent ‘cause there’s lots of them. So you go to a garden, it might cost you £2.50 to go in and you can also then buy teas and coffees and cake inside. What usually happens is the garden has to give a certain amount to Macmillan nurses.

Visiting open gardens is a family day-out experience for James. It is fortunate that the Yellow Garden Scheme enables him to combine a family outing with charitable giving. While not primarily motivated to give, James is conscious and content that some of the proceedings from the ticket sale go the charity. The charity has a special meaning for him because Macmillan nurses cared for his dying brother, though giving to them remains largely incidental.

While individuals recognise that a charity is worthwhile, their overriding motivation is to socialise and to have fun. They reflect not upon the cause, but the event as an opportunity to meet family and friends. Mary enjoys charity runs because they are an excuse for getting together:

I always do a run for charity – part of that is fun as well because alright you are raising money for a good cause so that’s fantastic and everything, but
y’know there would be a group of us running together, and we’d have a picnic in the park afterwards and, so it’s a social thing as well, so it’s not really a hardship. Sometimes it’s an excuse to do something, maybe we wouldn’t go for that run unless it was for a charity thing, . . . So it’s an excuse really to do something quite fun.

After noting that she is raising money for a good cause, she moves to the real pleasure, the social gathering. The ability to discuss and share their experience with significant others is important. Without this social dimension, moral conventionalists would be less motivated to give. While recognising the intrinsic value of giving, they are moved by its instrumental and social value.

Moral conventionalists interpret social relationships and opportunities in relation to their dominant familial and collegial concern (Archer 2007). They strategise with the aim to benefit their loved ones when participating in charities. Rachel, a working class single mother, willingly volunteers for the Parent Teacher Association, so that she can safeguard her children’s interests:

I suppose the Parent Teacher Association is more for the children because . . . If there is going to be major changes in that school, and we have had some big changes, you know and I want to be part of it and I want to make sure that it’s the best things for my children.

Rachel also raises funds for her children’s majorettes club, so that they can travel abroad to perform. She is also a school governor at her children’s school, and assists teachers in a couple of classes. While Rachel deliberates on what actions are appropriate in light of her children’s interests, she also feels a moral obligation towards other children in the school and the majorettes club:

I do lots of things in school like the reading and everything, the teachers haven’t got time to read to the children anymore and the two classes I go to it’s nothing to do with my children. I could say I only want to do my own children, but you know to be honest I like reading to some of the others, getting to know some of the other children and helping them. So, yeah I think it’s good in that way I can go into school, I haven’t got it that everything’s got to around my own, I quite like that.

Sympathy and a feeling of moral responsibility are easier to solicit the closer others’ situations are to one’s own (Smith 1976). Rachel is sympathetic towards other children, who are in the similar situation to her own children. Her moral responsibilities expand beyond her own family circle towards others in the local community. Moral conventionalists can become active participants in local voluntary groups, school events and sports clubs, as the primary concern for the family shifts to others in the neighbourhood, resulting in a feeling of local solidarity.

In a competitive economic world, individuals have to strategise for cultural, social and symbolic capital with the aim to achieve an advantage over others (Bourdieu 1990). Although individuals can acquire symbolic capital in the philanthropic field (Collins and Hickman 1991), they can also be reflexive about their own motives and can make moral judgements that reflect both interestedness and disinterestedness (Sayer 1999; 2010). Madeleine, a working class estate agent, explains that while she initially organised the local Scout group to boost her career prospects, she now feels a moral obligation to help children from broken families:

It’s a fairly sort of some selfish motives for doing it. It would look good on my CV which is one of the reasons for starting it, if I wanted to do that kind of career. Secondly, I genuinely think I can give children other experiences that
they wouldn’t necessarily have and be a benefit to them. And I was just saying to my hairdresser before I left [to come here for the interview] that a lot of mothers always feel guilty that you’re not doing enough for your children or you look back at past events. I mean I was depressed for a number of years and probably wasn’t the best mother in the world, and I’m thinking maybe I can make up the shortfalls that I had with my children with other children that will somehow compensate.

Like Rachel, Madeleine’s moral obligations shifts from her own child to other children, and has a strong emotional and sympathetic connection towards parents, who are struggling to raise their children. She also reflects on how she is as vulnerable and dependent upon other parents, as they are upon her, especially when she organises the Scout group:

I sort of think maybe there are other people going through those kinds of hard times and I would like somebody to be able to do that for my children, to be able to give them a good experience when I’m having a hard time. So if I can do it for other people’s children, then maybe because we have got children that come that obviously don’t always have the happiest of times so just for that one hour I can be super-mum or super-leader [at the Scout group]. . . . It does matter that children have a good experience growing up and can enjoy the company of adults and relate to other adults and have fun together, and just enjoy their childhood and doing things that there suppose to do as a child.

Madeleine rightly identifies how individuals are fragile, needy and interdependent human beings, who have to care for and be cared by others. This relationship is not to be mistaken for reciprocity of exchange (Bourdieu 1990), since the motivation is not self-interest, but a moral obligation to future generations. To dismiss Madeleine’s ethical dispositions as a disguise is to offer a cynical view of human nature, and to ignore how mixed motives shape actions.

Sympathetic feelings are particularly strong amongst individuals who value collegial and familial relationships. They understand the fragile nature of human existence and the importance of support and comfort in everyday life, and often try to achieve an intimate connection with others in giving. Martha, a working class receptionist, who volunteers as a school mentor, reflects on her relationship with her mentee that began after the sudden death of her partner changed her perspective on life:

You get very philosophical when somebody dies. I have lost John [her partner], and that has made me see things in different ways, it has made me appreciate life. It’s made me see that small things matter, you know. Life is too short, you know, life is too precious, people are too selfish, you know . . . . It’s not to say, ‘Oh I am doing volunteer work. Look at me, I am so perfect!’ It’s just something that when it’s just Cheryl [her mentee] and I it’s something good that I am doing, you know. It’s something that we have got, it’s something that I can give to somebody and it’s quite easy as well. . . . You see her happy, or she gives you a little text after we have been out, ‘Oh that was really good. Thank you.’ And so, it doesn’t cost anything, you know to do something good really.

Martha faces a tension in participating in charities. Although an emotional bond has developed between her and her mentee, epitomised by mobile text messages, it is a painless commitment that she finds easy to thread into her social life. The danger is that if the relationship becomes too burdensome or too difficult to dovetail with her other commitments, she will abandon it, however regrettable this may be. Given their
priority to family and friends and limited time and resources, moral conventionalists have low threshold for abandoning charities. Consequently, charitable giving is likely to be short-lived and confined to local and convenient sites.

Deliberations on donations are usually fleeting and casual. They reflect a general concern for good causes, rather a deep assessment of their relative importance and impact. In some cases, moral conventionalists use direct debit and events, such as anniversaries, celebrations and holidays, to donate money, reducing the need for intense reflections and evaluations on charities. Paul, a former working class commercial engineer now retired, donates to several well-known charities:

For a very long time I've been making a regular monthly donation to a few chosen charities. The RSPCA I see them as the umbrella organisation for all animal welfare, and I will not give money to any other animal charity on a regular basis. I do believe in the work of, like, Compassion in World Farming and these charities that look after, you know, old horses and greyhounds and things that – I cannot abide cruelty to animals. I also give money on a regular basis to the NSPCC, which again I see as an umbrella organisation for children, I will also give to the Macmillan Nurses and Cancer Research and I consider that sufficient. . . . I'd also give, you know, to certain Christmas charities, because I think, you know, there's always a tradition in Britain that at Christmas you like to think of people who are not as fortunate as you. . . . I think it's very important that you do that, you know, at least I think if you're thinking about people it's better than not thinking about them.

While Paul is compassionate about animals, children and sick people, his donations are confined to umbrella organisations and major occasions. Christmas becomes a time of year to think about less fortunate groups, evoking acts of generosity. Moral conventionalists often donate to established charities at traditional times of the year, such as Armistice Day, when people gather together. Such donations require little research and inconvenience.

Media appeals and street collections can trigger immediate sympathy, moving individuals to make a donation there and then. Such spontaneous donations are heart-felt, but not deep, and are highly accessible and convenient, requiring a minimal level of effort and time, as Jane notes:

For quite a lot of the time I have had no means of giving online or on the phone, because I had no debit or credit cards, so you could only give when it was in your face. When it's your face and I think it's easier for everybody to give stuff that's in your face. Like with the tsunami, there were pots in Tescos and in every bank, so it was easy. And I think that some people find these telethons easy, because they can phone and give the money straight away.

By being 'in your face', Jane can easily respond to a charity appeal without too much effort by dropping money into a collection box, after shopping at the supermarket or going to the bank. When she and her children became emotionally distraught by the Christmas tsunami disaster, they gave generously, partly because her bank made it easy for them. Moral conventionalists have a low pain threshold for giving, and should they face significant obstacles, they will simply not bother.

To sum up, individuals with familial and collegial values are sensitive to other people's suffering, and are moved to give. But they are not likely to be deeply
committed to charitable causes, as they can conflict with their ultimate concern of family and friends. Moral conventionalists view charities as events for socialising and having fun with significant others. Nevertheless, they can act with disinterestedness and can be sympathetic and caring towards others beyond their own family circle, having a feeling of moral obligation to others in a similar situation to themselves. Their deliberations on donations are fleeting and momentary, and are time-space restricted to local traditional charities at certain times of the year. Giving causes little disruption to their lives.

**Moral Individualism**

Individuals with a deep commitment to work and performative acts have a strong sense of work ethics. Their personal identity centres on work and career, obtaining satisfaction and recognition from work (Archer 2003). They often seek to change work to produce a better fit between their career aspirations and the workplace.

Jackie, a lower middle class financial administrator, switched jobs twice in pursuit of better opportunities, advancements and recognition, and now enjoys the strategic decision-making part of her work:

> My interest isn’t in real number-crunching, producing accounts and balance sheets and things like that, it's very much more the forward looking, the planning, you know . . . If we, you know, particularly at the university, can assume we’re gonna get this many student numbers, that'll bring in this much income, we’d need to run stuff at these costs, you know, that side of things is what interests me, the real sort of more strategic side of it.

Jackie also undertakes extra training and qualifications as she aims to develop her career. She wants to become a chartered accountant, and spends part of her time studying for professional exams. Many career-minded individuals are quite disciplined in dovetailing work with studies, family and friends. Peter, a working class prison officer and a part-time mature student, deliberately chose The Open University degree as it helps to fit the different things together:

> The Open University suits people like me I think, as well as various other people. It’s part-time. It suits me. I can listen to a lot of material and learn stuff in the car on the way to work. I can take my books into work while I’m supervising prisoners, or I might have a bit of downtime on my lunch break, so I can read through that. When I do get home and I’ve got some time, I can then type up my assignments. I don’t think it’s a case of seeing anybody less or spending less time with people, but I can have my friends over and I can still be studying while they’re over because I’m still spending quality time with my friends, although I might be doing other things, they’re still around me.

The Open University degree offers Peter a good compromise of work and study, without making too many demands upon his personal and family life. At the moment Peter knows he cannot get far within the prison service without a degree. He wants to be promoted as a manager once he has finished the degree. Career-minded individuals are reflexive and content about making sacrifices for a better career.

For career-focused individuals, giving has a largely instrumental value. For instance, they consciously aim to strengthen their curriculum vitae, by strategically using charitable acts to advance their own economic interests (see Curtis 1997; Shapely 2001; Kidd 1996). Peter believes that when the prison service gets restructured in the
future he may have to look for another employment. By volunteering as a special constable, he has a competitive edge over other applicants should he apply to join the police:

As a volunteer, you’re getting a background if you like into that before you make the full jump into being a police officer – you go through all the assessments and stuff. An average Joe off the street, going for a job as a police constable, they don’t really know what it’s all about and they haven’t got the inside story if you like and they don’t know what’s going on, so it’s a bit of a risk, whereas, as a special, you get a bit of a background. . . . I’m in the prison service at the moment. I’m quite happy, but things change. I know the prison service is changing, and nobody’s really sure whether it’s for the better or the worse, so yeah, the police is an option for employment in the future.

Peter is reflexive about improving his job prospects, crafting a better position in the future. He strategises giving for symbolic profit. Volunteering is not a disinterested act or even a guised economic one. Rather career-minded individuals are openly motivated by the benefits of charitable practices. Phoebe, a former working class personal secretary now a postgraduate mature student, plans to volunteer for three weeks at a primary school in Ghana in order improve her chances of getting a university scholarship:

To make my application more effective for funding to do my second year, it’s important that I go to Ghana for a few weeks between now and next September, because if I don’t they’re gonna turn round and say, if you’ve never been, how do you know you’re gonna last 5 minutes? So at least if I’ve been, then I can say I’ve been there.

Both Peter and Phoebe play the charity game to further their careers. To some extent, they are a reflexive version of Bourdieusian actors. They do not feel guilty about using charity as an economic strategy, but rather regard themselves as being acute and intelligent in knowing how to navigate through the system to get what they want. They are honest, but not cynical, about their real motives. They just aspire for a good career.

Self-interestedness need not necessarily mean cold-heartedness, as individuals can be compassionate on the basis of assessing their own vulnerability. Rawls (1999) notes how self-interested individuals may be motivated to act in the interests of vulnerable others, if there is a likelihood of being in the same position. Patrick, a working class student and a part-time special constable, donates to an ambulance charity in the knowledge that one day he may have to use its life saving services:

You do feel good about thinking the money you’re giving has potentially, you know, saved random people’s lives with regards to Kent Air Ambulance which one day I think, you never know, it might save my life. ‘Cause with regards to the police job and we’re out and about, we’re in a situation where people never know, when a couple of months ago, sadly one of the police officers – I never worked with him, but he worked in a different policing area – he got run over on a seventy mile an hour road. Kent Air Ambulance obviously attended, took him away and unfortunately he died later on in hospital. But you just think, that you know, Kent Air Ambulance is there to support anyone and you never know, I might get run over one day on duty, it might come and pick me up and take me straight to a specialist hospital and might have saved my life. So I know by donating money it might save my life
as well instead of other peoples.

Patrick knows that there is a need for a good ambulance service in case he and other constables get injured whilst on duty. His donation to the ambulance charity reflects an element of enlightened self-interest. Moral individualists exhibit both self-interest and sympathy, enabling a degree of engagement with charities on the basis of reciprocity. They contribute to society in the belief that they will also gain from the transaction. Consequently, they possess a weak obligation to donate to charities that do not provide any immediate benefit to them. Often such charities, usually those operating overseas, are criticised for being wasteful and ineffective.

Moral individualists can view charities as a coping strategy to address personal and family problems. Charities are particularly valuable in situations where individuals lack strong family networks and ties, and cannot oblige family members to assist them (see Finch and Mason 1993 on the variable nature of family responsibilities). Lacking family support, they sometimes turn to charities for help. When Mandy’s son was diagnosed with autism, her relationship with her parents became quite strained, feeling that they were unsympathetic and unsupportive. In addition, her marriage broke down under the strain of raising an autistic child. Feeling very lonely, Mandy, a working class mature postgraduate student, managed to find some relief from her son’s challenging behaviour by volunteering at his school:

I found it therapeutic to be in [the school children’s] company of how they should be acting, and actually enjoy the day and then I think I was kind of in the right frame of mind to deal with [my son’s] challenging behaviour, if that makes sense? I don’t know, but I think that’s why I found it enjoyable, is why I kept doing it, and things like, you know, going to assembly and even hearing them all sing and I did find it therapeutic. . . . [The] voluntary work I think I was more helping myself. I knew I was helping the children because an extra pair of hands [in the classroom], and I felt good about having spent a day with them, but I think the main motivator probably was the therapy that I kind of felt from doing it.

Mandy derived much comfort from being a school volunteer, nurturing her inner strength to deal with her son’s challenging behaviour. Unable to properly communicate with her parents and her ex-husband, she viewed volunteering as an important safety valve that relieved personal tensions. In addition, she relied upon a local support group of the National Autistic Society, to which she donated money in exchange for advice and assistance. The contract-like relationship with the charity ended, when she no longer needed its support and so stopped donating and buying its charity Christmas cards:

I did support the National Autistic Society with donation and Christmas cards, because it was something affecting me and I sort of did do it to try and keep them going because I thought they were really worthwhile. I did support them [when my son was diagnosed with autism], but then it kind of went a whole turnabout point where things sort of moved on, [and he] was in school. I think last year was the first time I didn’t buy the cards, because I kind of thought I don’t need to be sending everyone a card with NAS on it. I kind of felt that in my head I was okay with it.

As Mandy became better at coping with her son’s autism, she stopped going to the local support group meetings and buying charity cards. She had moved on, no longer troubled by her son’s challenging behaviour. Although she remains highly appreciative of its past support, she does not feel obligated to carry on buying its charity Christmas
cards. Moral individualists are weakly embedded into charities, and are likely to exit, rather than to stay loyal. As a coping strategy, giving has a limited lifespan, becoming redundant when the problem has been resolved or other coping strategies prove to be better.

Moral individualists, who are semi- or fully retired, can achieve a sense of pride and self-worth from undertaking practices that form the basis of the charity. They derive pleasure from performing challenging tasks well, and obtain personal satisfaction and social recognition from executing practices to a high standard (Keat 2000). They focus on getting their performance right, demonstrating their skills, knowledge and competence. Terry, a former middle class naval officer now a semi-retired business owner, manages a local naval museum that allows former and retired naval officers, mechanics and engineers to restore de-commissioned sea vessels for public viewing at a historical dockyard. When the naval dockyard closed down because of defence cuts, Terry and other former naval workers volunteered to turn parts of the dockyard into a museum:

[When the dockyard closed] there were all these highly trained mechanics, communication specialists, engineers and so on. What do we do? Where do we go? . . . I saw the admiral, who was the chairman of the dockyard trust, and said, ‘We haven’t got a job anymore, do you want some of the lads and girls down here?’ He said, ‘Bring them down for volunteering!’ So we had about a hundred come in and then they all divvied up into different projects, we started on the submarine first of all, got it ready and open to the public, took two years. We had all sorts of different things for people to put their skills to – naval skills into other skills, museum-y type skills, you know, resurrecting things, restoring craft, ships, small-crafts, a helicopter. Someone went into archive work, someone into cataloguing photographs and books.

Terry and other volunteers have recreated some aspects of their naval career that has been so important for them. While their work is no longer economically viable with the loss of the naval site, the volunteers have put their skills and knowledge into a different but related use, charitable heritage work. They take great pride in restoring the naval site into a historical dockyard, demonstrating to themselves and others of the importance of their skills and knowledge in bringing back to life retired war vessels for public display. Their volunteering affirms the importance of their career to them and others, especially so when their work is celebrated and recognised as part of the national naval heritage, and members of the Royal Family pay special visits to the dockyard. Although most of the volunteers are either semi- or fully retired, work remains a key part of their identity, now recycled as charity and heritage work.

Whereas younger career-minded individuals, such as Peter, Phoebe and Patrick, seek to strategise giving for symbolic profit, older and retired workers aim to give meaning, integrity and worth to their performative acts through charitable deeds. Internal goods and intrinsic value matter as much as external goods and instrumental value in shaping moral individualists’ performative acts (Keat 2000; Sayer 2005). In failing to acknowledge how Terry’s and other volunteers’ integrity, pride and personal satisfaction define charitable practices, the overly instrumental Bourdieusian analysis mis-recognises moral motives and actions (à la Curtis 1997; Kidd 1996).

For moral individualists, giving to charitable causes is secondary to the main motivation of gaining satisfaction from the charitable performance. They engage with charities on their own terms, aiming to perform at charities, rather than to serve them. Zoë, an upper middle class lecturer, enjoys giving occasional lectures for free to the Workers’ Educational Association, a non-profit adult educational institute:
I tend to do some teaching for the Workers’ Educational Association. . . . I’ll teach for nothing. . . . It’s just a really good thing to be doing, everyone’s getting a lot out of it, people like it. I get a lot out of it too. . . . It was really done because I enjoy teaching, . . . and I just enjoyed doing it, and I’d do that any time because I enjoy it, so I think that it was great because people love literature, they loved the course, all that stuff, but also I was getting something out of it too.

Teaching at the Workers’ Educational Association is a way of expressing her passion for English literature and the arts, rather than empowering adult learners, which is a side effect of her teaching. She is enthused by the joy of teaching, which constitutes the charitable practice. Moral individualists are motivated by the pleasure and recognition of their performance at charities, rather than for them. They may perform, but they do not serve. They regard their charitable activities as hobbies that give them intrinsic pleasure. They stop doing them, when they no longer get any satisfaction:

It’s a self thing that you feel that you enjoy it, so why give it up if you enjoy it. One thing I would say about volunteering is I feel very comfortable about the fact, if I suddenly come to the point where I think to myself I’m not enjoying this any more, then I can just say sorry I’m not gonna do it any more, finished. I don’t have to give any reasons. . . . I don’t necessarily have to feel guilty about it. All the time I feel that I personally enjoy doing it, if it helps somebody else along the way, then that’s a bonus, but I’m probably selfish in thinking the reason why I do it is because I like doing it, end of story. (Jimmy, a former lower middle class training consultant now retired)

Jimmy does not feel guilty about being self-interested. Should pleasure or benefit not materialise from his volunteering, he will give it up. While moral individualists take delight in their charitable performative acts, they do not give themselves to charitable causes.

Moral individualists are not intensely reflexive about donations, as their deliberations are usually fleeting and ad hoc. Most of the time, giving is a matter of convenience. Patrick does not give donations much serious thought:

I didn’t care, obviously, what charity it was, you know, I’m just getting rid of the money at the end of the day. Most of the time now, it’s as they’re giving me the change, if I see it’s ‘1ps’, ‘5ps’, ‘2ps’ I just quickly shove it in the charity box, or I say to them just shove it in a charity box and they do it for me. They’ve got one behind the counter, they do it there.

It is inconvenient for Patrick to accept loose change, so he rather put it in a collection box. He does not care to which charity he is giving his loose change. Patrick also empties his wallet of loose change at a charity box in a supermarket or a garage when his wallet becomes bulky. While he will look out for his preferred charity, Kent Air Ambulance, he will also put the money in the nearest collection box. There are times when moral individualists will carefully assess how and when to give as a strategic action, but often charitable donations do not occupy them. Jackie is candid about her lack of reflexivity on the subject:

In all honesty it’s not a massive part of me. . . . I don’t sit and feel, ‘Should I be doing something? I’m probably not pulling my weight’, or whatever it might be, if you see what I mean. ‘I could be doing more.’ . . . I don’t consciously sit there thinking about ‘I do this, I don’t do that’ you know. ‘I give this much this month, nothing in later months’, or you know. It’s just very ad hoc and it’s very much, like I say, reactive, as and when I’m asked for things I will do. But it
doesn’t matter enough to me, to be going out there, to try and find what else I could be doing.

Jackie does not feel excited or upset about giving or not giving, and will donate when asked to do so. Charity is not significant for her. She is much more reflexive and concerned about trying to dovetail her career and studies with her new family.

To sum up, moral individualists are so intensely reflexive about their career, studies and performative acts that there is little consideration for other activities. When they do deliberate on giving, it is for instrumental and strategic reasons, aiming to capitalise on their charitable acts for symbolic gain. On occasions, they value their performance at charities in order to achieve pleasure, satisfaction and recognition. They engage with charities on their own terms, rather than serving them.

Compassion and Social Justice

Individuals with a deep commitment to moral values and faith have a strong sense of compassion and social justice. Their lives are shaped by ethical reflections, constructed out of an amalgam of social and cultural fragments of different moral traditions, such as Christianity, humanism, human rights and liberalism (MacIntyre 1988: 2). They are intensely reflexive about major social and political problems, such as homelessness and the environment, as well as of everyday personal matters, such as shopping and family responsibilities (Sayer 2000). William, an upper middle class lecturer, agonises over the morality of his undeclared income:

I have some additional income from various little bits and bobs, things like teaching piano lessons and so on, and you know, part of me thinks, it would be very easy, I get paid in cash, you know just have this little bit of extra income, not to mention it to the tax people and so on, and obviously then it’s a moral question of, ‘Do you alert the tax people to what is a comparatively modest part of your income and thereby see twenty percent of it disappear again?’ . . . I debate the issues and say, you know, ‘What do I want to do here? What is the right thing to do? Does it matter?’

William is morally reflexive about his undeclared income, embarking upon an internal conversation, asking and responding to questions, and mulling over his moral dilemma (Archer 2003). Another internal debate he has is whether he should purchase Fair Trade and organic products, or should opt for cheap and non-ethical luxury items at the supermarket.

Archer (2007) notes that morally reflexive individuals breathe life into moral ideals, interpreting social structures and practices in relation to their beliefs and faith. They aspire to lead a complete ethical life. Sophie, an upper middle class researcher, is passionate about protecting the eco-system, abhorring its abuse:

I just feel that my purpose on this planet is to help and protect animals and every day when I leave for work to catch a bus, if it’s been raining all the worms are up on the ground and I can’t walk by and step over them or whatever. I move every single worm, every single slug and snail that I see along the road as I get to the bus stop. . . . And as far as I’m concerned if it’s living, then it has a right to live and we don’t have the right to kill it. I will rescue anything I can to give it the opportunity to live. [In my local supermarket], I’ve got a whole campaign, in fact they dread me coming in now, because they are failing to water their plants regularly. So when I go in, I insist on the manager coming, pointing out which ones want watering. . . .
just feel that God has put me on this planet to sort of protect animals and to some degree plants and stuff like that. . . . [In] ordinary stuff I’m as quite as a mouse and I really don’t stand up.

Sophie deliberates on matters relating to animal welfare and plant life to the point that her *modus vivendi* is dominated by those concerns. Although she is withdrawn and reticent in everyday work and social situations, she is quite forthright and confident in helping animals and plants, going to extraordinary lengths to intervene on behalf of nonhuman living things, believing that it is her ‘calling’. In the past, she has rescued various animals from neglect and harm, and has started campaigns to stop developers from destroying primroses and wild orchids and chopping down trees. She also refuses to donate to specific charities that experiment on animals. She believes that she and the animals shared a special affinity that allows her to understand and talk to them.

Adherence to faith and values may mean forsaking other valuable goods, especially when personal beliefs rub against social conventions and norms. The process can involve considerable pain and loss. Sophie partly regrets how her life has unfolded as result of holding on to her values:

> I still have an idea of what’s right or wrong and maybe it’s that that has ruled my life more than anything else and that’s not just in relation to animals, in relation to sex before marriage and stuff like that and I can honestly say it’s ruined my life. . . . All my relationships have failed because either they say I’m too good for them or because I won’t have sex, because I wanted to do it the correct way and get married. I think that’s the price you pay to go against what the world now does.

Despite some doubts about her sacrifices, Sophie will not abandon her beliefs because they are so integral to her way of life. While morally reflexive individuals set high standards of moral behaviour for themselves and others and seek to pursue their moral values and faith, dovetailing ethical projects with family and career concerns is nevertheless required, however difficult this may be. Though Harry, a former upper middle class journalist now a lecturer, loathes making compromises, he has had to make them over time to be with his family:

> Essentially compromise is what it says. Compromise is not the ideal, it is not what one originally wanted, so I sought to avoid compromise as much as possible when I was young. I didn’t need to make it. But things happen which make compromise more attractive and that involves having someone you love who you want to be with and the children, the product of that relationship who you want to nurture not simply support financially.

Early in his career, Harry worked as a news reporter and then as a senior news editor, driven by his passion for journalism’s role in educating the public about politics and in making the political system more democratic and accountable. But as his years overseas and many hours in the office began to take a heavy toll on his family, he had to re-balance his life by compromising his ideals. He gave up the job as a senior news editor to become a freelance journalist, writing political commentaries for newspapers and magazines, before moving into higher education.

Morally reflexive individuals are motivated to give to relieve suffering and to show compassion towards vulnerable others, who find themselves due to ill luck in bad circumstances. Their compassion emerges from understanding others’ perspective and imagining their situation (Nussbaum 2001a). Eve, a working class part-time hospital porter, gives to Shelter, a homeless charity, because the homeless are
vulnerable and dependent upon others to care for them:

For example, a single mother with three children whose other half batters her. She will have to go and get temporary housing to be housed away from him and then she’ll be left in there for two year. That’s not her fault. . . . That’s just a bad situation, bad circumstances, bad luck really and a lot of the people who are homeless, it’s just bad luck that’s befallen them and so they need help really and the government doesn’t help them and they fall through the net, so and it’s sad and not enough people really care about it as far as I can see. There’s too much of this, kind of, it’s their own fault sort of idea.

Eve has sympathy for the homeless as she was made homeless a couple of times in the past, and believes that the public misunderstands them. As well as being sympathetic and compassionate, morally reflexive individuals are often critical of the social system (Archer 2007). Eve is angry that the government does not provide sufficient temporary and emergency accommodation or adequate financial assistance, especially during the current economic crisis when job cuts can result in mortgage payment defaults.

Moral critics are reflexive about their own privileged social position, and act in a morally responsible manner (Sayer 2010). Individuals with greater economic, cultural and symbolic resources can emit moral sentiments of compassion, fairness and integrity, trumping class sentiments of superiority, condescension and disgust (Sayer 2005). William feels that his privileged status as a white middle class British citizen enables him to make effective interventions in pursuit of his moral beliefs and ideals:

It’s a belief ultimately that all people should have an equal opportunity, but the nature of the world we live in does not give that. . . . Being where I am, in history and geography and social standing and so on, is comparatively an extraordinarily privileged position to be in. . . . I can do things with my money that can make a difference. Not just in terms of my charitable giving, but in terms of where I can spend it, buying the things I choose to buy. So, for example, choosing to buy Fair Trade products.

In the past, William has used his knowledge of information technology to initiate and organise a couple of recycling schemes. Although he is no longer involved in operating them, they are still running after almost 8 years. The first scheme sells re-conditioned discarded computers to students, the profit from which is donated to charities. The second scheme is a citywide social networking site that allows people to recycle for free their furniture, clothes and bric-a-brac. As we shall see later, William currently gives very thoughtfully to several charities to tackle global poverty and environmental issues.

Some individuals can possess the ‘burdened’ virtue of compassion, assisting others to the detriment of their own personal comforts (Tessman 2005). Eve struggles to pay her local council tax and utility bills, but feels comparatively well off and has a strong sense of moral obligation to the homeless:

I am passionate about Shelter yeah. I know that there are people out there that are worse off than me. . . . I guess people who are in sort of privileged positions, i.e. have a house, have good education, have enough to get by on, have a job, have money and generally happy, it’s really kind of our responsibility that other people do have, who aren’t as fortunate, that they can have some kind of happiness.

Feeling relatively privileged, Eve makes monthly donations to the homeless charity and tithes to her local church, which uses some of its income to manage an
accommodation centre for the homeless. When walking down the street at night, she often stops to talk and give cigarettes to people sleeping out, some of whom she knows from her own turbulent past. Although her partner gets upset that she makes ‘excessive’ contributions when they do not have enough food on the table or enough money to heat the house, she feels duty-bound to give tithes and donations, and usually gives cigarettes to the homeless without her partner finding out. Whereas some rich privileged individuals can fail to act upon their humanitarian or egalitarian beliefs, making various excuses and justifications (Cohen 2000), moral critics are bound by them.

Moral critics are deeply committed to charitable causes, investing time and energy into projects for reasons of compassion and social justice, rather than symbolic profits, reflecting Bourdieu’s less cynical writings on giving (Silber 2009). Kamela, an upper middle class informational technology manager, considers how disinterested giving is necessary for her and others’ well being, and how individuals as interdependent and needy beings have to rely upon others for care and support:

Sometimes you have to give first, and sometimes you have to give and get kicked in the face for doing it and still give. . . . I’d still rather carry on being that than being cynical and bitter, because that not only affects everybody else around me and their quality of life if I’m cynical and bitter, but it sure as hell affects mine, you know, my outlook on life. . . . Because no man’s an island. You know we’re all interconnected, and most of us wanna go through life with people being nice to us, and not being sort of cynical and thinking ‘Oh, I’m alright Jack!’

Kamela dismisses the reciprocal and instrumental attitude towards giving as cynical and bitter that can narrow individuals’ horizons and concerns. Almost echoing Bourdieu’s (2000: 201-2) last note on giving, Kamela notes that individuals depend upon various associations and communities to flourish, and condemns individualism for causing social inequalities and indifference:

We’re not gonna have the best society we can, unless people are prepared to give. . . . We went a lot wrong in our society in the Thatcher years, when everybody thought it was okay to make lots of money and ‘I’m alright Jack, and stuff you!’, and what does it matter if I make a fortune on the back of three million unemployed, you know, I’m okay, my family’s okay. You know, it really annoys me when people say charity begins at home, what you mean just within that four walls, you know, what is home? Home’s big? You know, I believe in communities, I believe in church communities, school communities, you know, guides and cubs and that sort of thing. . . . So I just think we’re a poorer society if we don’t give.

Kamela suggests that neo-liberalism can hinder the development of individuals’ wider circle of concern and compassion, thereby threatening the sustainability of civil society. Social and cultural institutions have to be supported to nurture human capabilities and well being (Nussbaum 2000; MacIntyre 1985). While Kamela disagrees with her vicar’s conservative views, she nevertheless continues to donate to her parish church because she wants the building and the community to be there in the future for everyone, not just for conservative or radical churchgoers.

Morally reflexive individuals are critical of how the social system either unfairly treats marginal and minority groups, such as youth offenders and the homelessness, or operates in unethical ways, such as the exploitation of animals and the environment. They can make critical and impartial judgements on social institutions and practices (Smith 1976), sometimes supporting charitable causes in the face of public
disapproval. Kamela, who volunteers for the Independent Monitoring Board, an organisation that protects prisoners’ rights, describes how the public is not always sympathetic towards prisoners, resulting in mistaken judgements:

I suppose prisoners are not popular are they, you know, it’s very difficult to get sympathy for prisoners, yeah I find it so frustrating when people moan about that fact that they have TVs in their cells, like a four star hotel. . . . You know, there’s this attitude that they just need a bit more discipline and you know, it tends to come from people who don’t know what it’s like to not have emotional support, to not have a certain level of financial support, they don’t know what it’s like, as a kid, to lie under your covers wondering whether somebody’s gonna come into the room and thump you, they don’t understand any of these aspects, they don’t understand what it’s like to be alienated at school. . . . [Prisoners] obviously have rights taken away from them, that’s why they’re in prison, but in terms of being treated with respect and humanely they have, you know, the same rights as any of us, and if me going in there ensures that happens, that they get treated humanely, and with respect, then that’s worth it. If they are being treated humanely and with respect while they are inside prison gives them the opportunity to turn their lives around when they come out because they are given some sense of worth because of their treatment, then that has to be a real plus.

Kamela has sympathy, understanding and compassion for the prisoners, motivating her to fight for social justice and human rights. She ensures that prison rules are correctly followed, and that prisoners are given ample opportunities and encouragement to lead a worthy life. She is scornful of the way right-wing newspapers create a moral panic, causing a public outcry against measures to treat then in a humane manner.

Moral critics are active citizens, who are motivated by political and moral ideals to instigate and support initiatives and actions to develop human well being, civil society and the environment. In a socially dynamic context, a mis-match can develop between their ideals and the charities, causing them to leave for other charities that better fit their ideals (Archer 2007). Their personal history of participation in civil society can be characterised by mixed emotions, such as hope, trust, disappointment, frustration and satisfaction. When Geraldine, a working class postgraduate mature student, was living in Paris, she was impelled to fight for oppressed and marginalised groups, and was involved in violent forms of politics against the government and the police, throwing bricks through windows and intimidating opponents. But the tactics and outcomes of the radical left disappointed her, causing her to re-examine herself and to become a ‘soft’ anarchist. She felt that oppressed groups and minority causes would be better served by working within the social system, and she started to volunteer at a migration centre, helping to translate for English-speaking African illegal immigrants, who were about to be deported. After several months, Geraldine became disillusioned with her work, as it was too administrative and was no longer connecting well with her interest in how people with mental illnesses and diseases were being victimised and suppressed in society. She left the centre to volunteer at a local hospital, working with children who had mental disabilities. She found this highly rewarding, but had to return to the UK to look after her father, who had become seriously ill.

Her active engagement with UK charities produced similar mixed feelings of hope, satisfaction and disappointment. She was influential in starting up a self-advocacy group for people with learning disabilities in her local community. The group was successful, expanding its membership and winning local council grants to run training
programmes. But after two years, Geraldine had achieved her goal to empower the group members, and had nothing more to offer:

[We were] supporting people with illiteracy, supporting people with having the confidence to speak in front of people, supporting people to learn things like how do you run a meeting, and what sort of behaviours are appropriate when you go in a big meeting and, for example, going up to London, supporting people on the tube because that’s something that they couldn’t necessarily do. And also at the same time, doing yourself out of a job. The main thing you have to do is know what the ideal is. At the end of two years, they don’t really need you. And I don’t know whether the project director who runs the group would agree or not, but I thought we got there at the end of last year. That they really didn’t need a supporter/carer any more.

At the start Geraldine was delighted with her role as a supporter and carer within the group, but as existing needs began to be satisfied, new needs developed that she could not meet and left frustrated. She had successfully done herself out of a job, and a different type of person was required. Geraldine now volunteers for Médecins Sans Frontières, which she praises for its medical assistance to people living in dangerous and unsafe places and its critical comments on foreign governments.

In criticising existing social structures and practices, moral critics offer alternative visions for society. Their motivation and support for charitable causes partly reflects their alternative visions, constructed out of an amalgam of social and cultural fragments of different moral traditions (MacIntyre 1988: 2). Geraldine combines anarchism with Catholicism in explaining her motivation for giving:

To me, money, finance, property, owning, things, materialism is not good. It’s fundamentally not good. It goes against everything that makes people brilliant, all the things that make people really special like love, like creativity, like companionship, like the ability to self-sacrifice, all those things that lift people up from being just bio-chemical machines. Money goes contra against that. Ownership goes against that. There is no bigger evil than property. . . . I’ve always felt uncomfortable with the idea of being paid to do something, I guess. And volunteering means that you can be sure that you’re doing it for the right reasons. . . . You have to have motivation: if you take money out of the equation, then you have to be motivated by something else. And so, if it’s not a love for the people that you work with, then it’s a love for the thing that you do. Or a love for the sense of self-worth that it brings you.

Other moral critics offer different amalgams of political, cultural and moral beliefs. For instance, Harry draws upon humanism and liberalism, Sophie mixes veganism with conservative Christianity, Kamela combines egalitarianism with liberal Christianity, William mixes environmentalism with liberal Anglicanism, and Eve largely draws upon Evangelicalism. While religion is a common factor in many of the moral critics' personal accounts, its status as a causal mechanism or as being as decisive as other beliefs in explaining charitable giving is less certain (see Sayer 1992: 114-5 on causality).

Moral critics are purposeful in their charitable donations, collecting and assessing information on charities, judging which charities are likely to satisfy their ideals. Sometimes they will consult their partners, family members and friends to help with their assessments. William and his partner carefully analyse the effectiveness of different charities in several categories of charitable causes:

We sit down and make a list, things like environmental, animal rights, you
know, relief of poverty direct sort of emergency relief and also more long-term poverty-relief type and famine-relief, health concerns, and so on. And we say which of those do we believe in to the point that we want to support that category financially, what are the charities that then work in that sector and, of those, which do we believe are most effective so that our money will actually make the most difference and which have, policies and beliefs that we also subscribe to? . . . I’m reluctant to support, for example, Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth because I don’t subscribe to all their beliefs.

William and his partner agree on which categories of charities match their values and beliefs, and then evaluate the effectiveness and merit of particular charities operating in those sectors. Their deliberations occur once a year or so over a couple of months.

Moral critics often regard moral rules and social conventions, such as the religious duty of tithing, as guidelines, judging for themselves what is appropriate action (Nussbaum 2001b; Finch and Mason 1993). William criticises the church teaching on tithes in favour of practical moral reasoning:

‘Thou shalt tithe 10 percent’ – but that’s always annoyed me because when you look at it in more detail you discover it’s nowhere near as clear-cut as that . . . There’s a sense within Christianity, ‘What do you give to?’, you give to the church whereas, being on the fringes of Christianity, we are more questioning.

You know, is the church as an institution, as a collector of historic buildings, as in some instances, a purveyor of certain views we might not entirely agree with – certainly some churches we’re not supporting anyway. . . . We’d rather, I think, support some other things directly, while acknowledging that, for myself at least as a churchgoer, the church would not exist if it were not for such donations. I can’t very well go along to church each Sunday and expect it to be there and not make any financial contribution to its upkeep.

While William recognises his moral obligation to support the church, not wanting to free ride on others’ contributions, he does not subscribe to tithing 10% of his income, especially when he is on the fringes. Furthermore, after reading various theological writers on the subject, he has reasoned that the duty of tithing is illegitimate. While tithing was important in the past when the church was largely responsible for communal welfare, it was an unfair tax as the rich extorted produce and income from the poor. William also argues that he pays his taxes for the state, and not the church, to provide welfare provisions to the needy.

To sum up, morally reflexive individuals have intense deliberations on how their faith and values relate to the world, critically evaluating existing social structures and institutions and offering alternative visions, drawing upon an amalgam of cultural, moral and political beliefs and values. They are deeply committed to charitable causes and disinterested giving, recognising how individuals are vulnerable, needy and interdependent human beings, who require sympathy, compassion and care. They are active citizens, initiating actions and projects, impelled by their ideals. They act as moral critics, exercising practical moral reasoning, rather than following social conventions or seeking to accumulate symbolic profits.

**Conclusion**

I have examined three modes of moral reflexivity on charitable giving based upon their dominant moral concerns and commitments. First, moral conventionalists, who value family and friends, focus on charity events as an opportunity to socialise and to have fun with others. They are motivated by sympathy and compassion to give, and
have a feeling of moral responsibility towards others, who are in a similar situation to themselves. Second, moral individualists, who value work and career, emphasise charitable practices as performative acts that demonstrate their knowledge, competence and skills. They are motivated to give because of social recognition, instrumental value and convenience, and undertake charitable acts on their own terms. Third, moral critics are deeply committed to values and faith, reflected in their pursuit of moral ideals in charitable causes. They have intense deliberation on giving, motivated by sympathy, compassion and social justice.

Moral motivation and judgements on giving vary in terms of disinterestedness that offer valuable insights into the nature of human being, social practices and social reality. Moral responsibilities to others and deep commitments to charitable causes are an acknowledgement of how individuals are vulnerable, interdependent and needy beings, who need to take care of and to be cared by others for their own and others’ well being. Moral critics are particularly reflexive about the nature of human being and social reality when giving. In a competitive economic world, strategic judgements are necessary to accumulate economic and symbolic capital, but practical judgements are also required to do the right thing, involving sympathy, integrity, praise and praiseworthiness. In addition, well-executed performative acts are constituted by both internal and external goods. Moral conventionalists and individualists are reflexive about social practices, in that their judgements and motivations are mixed, partly intrinsic and partly instrumental.

Individuals differ in their stance towards society. Moral critics are active citizens, offering criticisms of and alternative visions for the existing social system. They initiate projects and donate purposefully, feeling a sense of moral obligation towards marginalised groups and minority causes. Moral conventionalists and individualists are less engaged, focusing on their own social networks and performative acts. But all the individuals contribute to the development of civil society in different and important ways. Moral conventionalists help to sustain families, neighbourhoods and social networks, moral individualists promote hobbies, sports and cultural activities in the community, and moral critics foster social movements and causes.

The paper provides two criticisms of the Bourdieusian framework on giving. First, there is little evidence to suggest that individuals possess class dispositions, feelings or personal qualities (i.e., habitus) that shape their charitable acts. Rather individuals interpret social structures and practices, including charities, in relation to their dominant moral concerns and commitments. For instance, moral critics are intensely reflexive about their relatively privileged social position, and their moral sentiments of compassion, fairness and integrity trump class sentiments of superiority, arrogance and disgust.

Second, there is no support for the cynical argument that individuals deliberately mis-recognise or disguise their charitable strategies to accumulate symbolic profits. Rather individuals possess mixed emotions and motivations for giving. For instance, moral conventionalists and individualists exercise sympathy, compassion and instrumental reasoning.

There are five important implications for social theory. First, social theory needs to incorporate how personal reflexivity and everyday morality impact upon social structures and practices. There is a tendency in social sciences to impute motivation and behaviour to social coordinates, neglecting how moral sentiments, judgements and responsibilities shape social practices. Individuals are evaluative beings, who have to interpret the social world in relation to things that matter to them.
Second, a social analysis of everyday morality needs to understand how an amalgam of cultural and political values from different moral traditions affects moral deliberations, priorities and actions. Often social scientists focus on class sentiments or religious affiliation as the basis for ethical reasoning, but there are two reasons for being cautious about the connection. First, class and religious sentiments can easily distort ethical practices, arising from feelings of condescension and shame. Second, class and religion appear to be common factors, rather than generative mechanisms, in my study.

Third, performative contradictions between moral ideals and actual practices deserve more attention in social theory. Everyday morality includes performative contradictions, as individuals are just as prone to making self-deceptive and akratic judgements as moral ones. It is important to understand how individuals justify holding on to moral values and beliefs, such as egalitarianism and humanitarianism, without acting upon them. For instance, individuals may passionately believe in redistributing wealth from rich to poor countries, but then fail to make any donations or to lobby governments for greater international aid.

Fourth, individuals participate in civil society in different and important ways depending upon their moral concerns and commitments. Social and political theory cannot assume that individuals desire to actively engage with others in the public sphere. Greater attention is needed on different modes of moral reflexivity, as well as on class, gender, ethnicity and skin colour.

Finally, sociology needs to engage with moral philosophy to explain the nature of moral responsibilities in our lives. Often, sociology does not adequately address how ethics constitutes social practices, focusing instead on power relations, vested interests and social conventions. In moral philosophy, ethics tends to be overly rationalistic, detached from everyday concerns, social structures and practical reasoning. In combining ethical and sociological aspects of social reality, we wish to avoid the artificial divide between the two disciplines, and to contribute towards a critical account of social practices.
Bibliography


Archer, Margaret (2003), Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Archer, Margaret (2007), Making our Way through the World: Human Reflexivity and Social Mobility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Archer, Margaret (2010), 'Routine, Reflexivity and Realism', Sociological Theory, 28.3: 272-303

Benhabib, Seyla (1992), Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics, New York: Routledge

Bourdieu, Pierre (1972), 'The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Reason', Social Science Information, 19-47


Bourdieu, Pierre (1990), The Logic of Practice, Cambridge: Polity


Collins, Randall and Neal Hickman (1991), 'Altruism and Culture as Social Products', Voluntas, 2.2: 1-15


Finch, Janet and Jennifer Mason (1993), Negotiating Family Responsibilities. London: Routledge

Garnham, Nicholas (1993), 'Bourdieu, the Cultural Arbitrary and Television', in Craig Calhoun, Edward LiPuma and Moishe Postone (eds), Bourdieu: Critical Perspectives, Cambridge: Polity, pp.178-192

Hirschman, Albert (1982), 'Rival Interpretations of the Market Society: Civilising, Destructive, or Feeble?', Journal of Economic Literature, 20.4: 1463-1484


Lamont, Michele (1992), Money, Morals and Manners: The Culture of the French and American Upper-Middle Class, Chicago: University of Chicago Press


Nussbaum, Martha (1990), Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature, New York: Oxford University Press


Nussbaum, Martha (2000), Woman and Human Development: The Capabilities
Nussbaum, Martha (2001a), Upheaval of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press


Sayer, Andrew (2005), The Moral Significance of Class, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press


Shapely, Peter (2001), ‘Urban Charity, Class Relations and Social Cohesion: Charitable Responses to the Cotton Famine’, Urban History, 28.1: 46-64


Smith, Adam (1976), The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund


About CGAP

The ESRC Centre for Charitable Giving and Philanthropy (CGAP) is the first academic centre in the UK dedicated to research on charitable giving and philanthropy. Three main research strands focus on individual and business giving, social redistribution and charitable activity, and the institutions of giving. CGAP is a consortium including the Universities of Strathclyde, Southampton and Kent, University of Edinburgh Business School, Cass Business School and NCVO. CGAP’s coordinating ‘hub’ is based at Cass Business School. CGAP is funded by the ESRC, the Office for Civil Society, the Scottish Government and Carnegie UK Trust.

For further information on CGAP, visit [www.cgap.org.uk](http://www.cgap.org.uk)